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PENNY (EXECUTOR OF PENNY) vs. BRICE.
1. Where a person dies before the expiration of six years from the time when
a cause of action first accrued to him, his executor, if he intends to sue upon
that cause of action, must, in order to prevent the operation of the Statute of
Limitations, commence his action before the expiration of the six years, and he
is not entitled to any further time for the purpose of investigating the affairs of
the deceased.
2. The rule laid down in 2 Williams on Executors 1706, 1 Tidd's Pract. 28,
and 2 Chitty's Archbold's Prac. 1212, from Buller's N. P., declared erroneous.

Special case stated for the opinion of the court.
This cause having proceeded as far as declaration, was by an
order of BYLES, J., referred under 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, to the
certificate of a barrister, who certified as follows:The action was brought to recover the balance of an account
for money lent and money paid due from the defendant to the
plaintiff's testator at the time of his death.
It was contended by the defendant's counsel that the whole
demand was barred by the Statute of Limitations, and I find that
it was except as to the sum of 1871. 13s. 5d. As to that sum, I
state the following case for the opinion of the court :The cause of action for the sum in question arose in England,
while the defendant was beyond the seas in India, whence he
returned some time in September 1856, and remained.
The other material facts arose in the year 1862, as follows:The plaintiff's testator died on the 31st of May, never having
brought any action. The plaintiff, his surviving executor, proved
the will on the 12th July. On the 1st October, six years had
elapsed since the defendant's return to England. On the 5th
November this action was brought. The plaintiff's counsel contended that the action had been brought within a reasonable time
after the death of the testator, and therefore was not barred.
The defendant's counsel contended that the action was barred on
the expiration of the six years, and he denied that the action had
been brought within a reasonable time. In so far as that question
may be treated as one of fact to be found by me for the court, I
find tat the action was brought within a reasonable time after
the death of the testator. The question for the opinion of the
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court is, whether as to the sum in question the action is barred
by the Statute of Limitations : Williams on Executors, 5th edit.
vol. 2, p. 1706. If it is not, judgment is to be entered for the
plaintiff for that sum. If it is, judgment to be entered for the
defendant barring the action.
2lcllish, Q. 0. ((lowie with him), for the plaintiff.-The passage
from Williams on Executors, 5th edit. vol. 2, p. 1706, cited in
the case by the arbitrator, is as follows :-" If the executor take
out proper process in assumpsit within a year after his testator's
death, the six years not having elapsed before, though they expire
within that period, yet, it is said, that will be sufficient to take
the case out of the statute." The note to this passage is: "Tidd
28, 9th edit., citing Cawer vs. James, Bull. N. P. 150; but see
s. c. reported in Willes 255, nor. Karver vs. James." On referring, however, to the report in Willes, the case does not bear out
the proposition. .Rhodes vs. Smethurst, 4 M1. & W. 42, was a
case where the debtor died and his executor was not sued till
after the expiration of six years from the time when the cause
of action accrued, and the statute was held to operate. [WILLFS,
J., referred to Curlewis vs. The Earl of Mornington, 7 E. & B.
283, affirmed in Exchequer Chamber. There is nothing in the
.present case to attach the equity of sect. 4 of the statute.] In
the absence of authority I can hardly ask the court to take the
case out of the operation of the statute.
Coleridge, Q. C. (J. C. Mathew'with him), for the defendant,
said that it would be unnecessary for him to address the court.
[The points for argument delivered by the defendant were: 1.
That the expiration of six years from the return of the defendant
to this country was under the circumstances a bar to the plaintiff's action. 2. That 21 Jac. 1, c. 13, s. 3, expressly requires
that an action of assumpsit shall be commenced within six years
after the cause of action accrued; and that this general rule
applies, except in cases which fall within the terns or within the
equity of sect. 4 of the same statute. 3. That cases within the
equity of the said 4th section are those in which actions have
been begun within six years, and have abated without default of
the plaintiff. 4. That the passage in Williams on Executors, 5th
edit. vol. 2, p. 1706, referred to in the case, is not supporled by
the authority cited as reported in Willes's Reports 255. 5. That
the plaintiff, as executor, might have sued without obtaining probate, and that the action was not begun within reasonable time.]
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ERLE, 0. J.-There has been no loss of any action commenced
by the testator. Judgment must be for the defendant.
WILLIAMS, J.-The passage in Williams on Executors is inserted out of deference to the learned author of Tidd's Practice
from which it is cited, but the words ,,it is said" are added to
show that it is merely inserted for that reason. If an action had
been brought by the testator, a quqestion might have arisen as to
whether the executor had continued the action within a reasonable time, but that not being so, the case seems to fall within the
general rule that the statute having bcgun to run continues to do
so.
WILLES and KEATING, JJ., concurred.
The very high authority of Williams
on Executors and Tidd's Practice, in
this country as well as in England,
makes the correction in the foregoing
case of great importance. The rule
is also stated positively in Chitty's
Archbold's Practice, vol. 2, p. 1212,
citing Butler's N. P. 150. It is not a
little remarkable, that these works
should have gone through so many editions, both in England and the United
States, at the hands of very careful and
competent editors, without so much as
a quwre of this passage; but what is
perhaps still more to be wondered at,
is the fact that a case decided so long
ago as 1741 (the date of Cawer vs.
James), and reported in a notoriously
second-rate book like Buller's Nisi
Prius, should have been regarded as
law for more than a hundred years,
without an occasion arising to bring
the point before a court for adjudication.
When it does come up it receives a dismissal so summary as to be almost
disrespectful to even an error, which is
so ancient.
In the United States, although the
statute of 21 -James 1 is still very
generally in force, this point does not
appear to have been decided in any
reported case, and indeed is not very
likely to have arisen, as in nearly all
the states there are statutory provisions

in regard to the settlement of decedents'
estates, which regulate the Statute of
Limitations in regard to executors and
administrators. There are very many
cases, however, upon points closely
resembling the one in discussion, and
in them, singularly enough, the principle of a year's time allowed the executor does not appear to have been even
contended for, the claim usually pressed
with most force being for the exclusion,
in computing the period of limitation,
of the time between the death of the
decedent and the granting of letters to
his executor or administrators.. The
courts, however, have with great uniformity adhered to the ground, that
where the statute has commenced to
run the death of neither party stops or
suspends it: Jackson vs. Hitt, 12 Verm.
285; Stewart vs. Spedden, 5 Md. 448;
Baker vs. Baker, 13 B. Mon. 406; Beauchamp vs. Mudd, 2 Bibb 537; Johnson
vs. Wren, 3 Stew. 180.
It may be interesting to our readers
to note, that Mr. Justice WILLiAmS has
very recently retired from the bench in
consequence of increasing deafness.
He was appointed in 1846, and has
always been regarded as one of the
ablest men on the English Bench,
which of late years has not been so
strong as it should be. His successor
is Mr. MONTrAoUE SMITH, a Queen's

